The Geostrategic Importance of Taiwan by its Geography to The USA: Part 1


When Japan launched an attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, it also launched an attack on the Philippines, launching World War II in the Pacific. It was the first shot in the Japanese Empire's campaign to assault and subjugate Southeast Asia in pursuit of its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The planes took out from Taiwan, which was then under Japanese military control. It served as the starting point for attacks on both the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies (presently Indonesia). Taiwan served as the organizational zone and key inventory base for Japan's military in Southeast Asia during the fight, as well as the control center for all transit over the Taiwan Strait. Except for Singapore, the US State Department stated at the time that no location in the Far East featured such a dominant role. The geology of Taiwan tells the tale.

Taiwan is located 100 miles east of China, along the edge of the South China Sea's transit routes. It is 200 miles to the south of the Philippines, 700 miles to China's Hainan Island, and 900 miles to Vietnam and the Spratly Islands. It is linked to the Ryukyu Islands to the north and lies 700 miles from Japan's main islands. Overall, Taiwan's critical location off the Chinese coast and between Northeast and Southeast Asia has met a variety of critical demands for local powers, both hostile and cautious. . Taiwan remains geologically at the confluence of a substantial chunk of East Asia's danger foci in the modern time. (In fact, duties dispatched from Taiwan may have an impact on a conflict on the Korean Peninsula.)

Using firsthand knowledge, the question is whether Taiwan would be as significant a crucial resource for a potential adversary in Asia now as it was for Japan in the 1940s. The primary powers that are now undermining the region's harmony and stability are the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Northeast Asia and its sponsor and protector, the People's Republic of China, which has dynamic continuing issues in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. Taiwan, which Beijing says is an important part of the Chinese territory, would improve China's strategic position in both regions. Controlling Taiwan would help China's actions in the South China Sea and let it assert its regional and oceanic arguments against the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei much more firmly.

China's universal "nine-run line" would appear out of nowhere to be far more authentic and successfully enforced by Beijing. The bulk of the 1600 long-range missiles now aimed at Taiwan and the US Navy might be relocated to Taiwan and redirected against the ships and areas of other Southeast Asian governments, as well as the transit routes used by global industry. China would be in a better position to make the South China Sea the "Chinese lake" that it claims as a verified right.

Furthermore, from China's perspective, Taiwan is one of the primary links in the mythical "first island chain" that includes Japan, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia. Beijing sees the navigational "stifle points" between those islands as requiring the People's Liberation Army's maritime access to the "second island chain" (Guam, the Marianas, the Palau island group, and other small islands in the central Pacific) and from there out of the shadows sea a long way from China's shores. China's East China Sea coastline falls short of the deepwater ports required to maintain its marine bases located there.

Its submarines should operate on a surface level until they can drop and plunge deeply when they reach the Ryukus archipelagoes. If China ruled Taiwan, its submarines would have a far easier time escaping into the Pacific from Taiwan's deep seaports. They might pose a new concern for Japan, which relies entirely on East Asia's water routes for oil and other natural resources. Chinese submarines and an improved ability to project power into the Pacific might also pose a greater threat to the United States Seventh Fleet, Guam, Hawaii, and, surprise, the West Coast of the United States. Furthermore, to the extent that China's far-reaching naval force diverts Washington and Tokyo and encourages North Korea's as of yet irresponsible pioneer, it might directly imperial South Korean security.

Control of the island of Taiwan, from a purely nautical and military standpoint, would constitute a massive essential resource for China, as well as a threat to the region in both Southeast and Northeast Asia, as well as the United States. Chinese control of Taiwan, its mechanically best-in-class economy, and control of the district's access into the South China Sea would have significant monetary, conciliatory, and political repercussions. . Despite a substantially more capably organized China, there would most likely be a decreasing influence as territory states recalculate their concerns. Singapore may be intimidated into a more pro-China stance, linking Beijing's control of the South China Sea with Taiwan to the north and Singapore to the south. Denying China that resource and influence are clearly in the vital security and financial interests of Southeast Asian, Japanese, and American states.

However, for a brief period following World War II, Washington appeared to overlook Taiwan's critical importance, even after China had fallen to the Communists. Secretary of State Acheson's well-known National Press Club speech in January 1950 depicted America's security advantage in Asia but did not include Taiwan or South Korea. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung, as well as their senior ally, Josef Stalin, saw the statement as proving that the United States would not protect either country and considered it as a green light for their expansionist aspirations. Pyongyang was the first to act, attacking South Korea in June 1950.

The Truman administration, which had previously dismissed Taiwan's security importance to the United States, was astonished by the exposed hatred and determined that it must not be tolerated. It orchestrated a rapid United Nations Security Council goal of endorsing the international use of power to protect South Korea. Fearing further Communist advances in Asia, the president changed direction again, dispatching the Seventh Fleet to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. (It was also designed to thwart Generalissimo Chiang Kai-effort  to re-ignite the Chinese Civil War.) Since their expulsion from China, the Nationalists had promised to reclaim the central region.) Truman's statement clarified the emotional shift in US policy toward Taiwan during Cold War:

"The attack on Korea proves unequivocally that Communism will no longer use disruption to defeat free countries, but will instead use aggression and war. It has defied the United Nations Security Council's directives to preserve global peace and security.”

In these circumstances, Communist control of Formosa would pose an urgent threat to the security of the Pacific area and the United States' powers operating in their legal and important roles in the region.

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