When Japan launched an attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941, it also launched an attack on the Philippines, launching World War II in
the Pacific. It was the first shot in the Japanese Empire's campaign to assault
and subjugate Southeast Asia in pursuit of its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere. The planes took out from Taiwan, which was then under Japanese military
control. It served as the starting point for attacks on both the Philippines
and the Dutch East Indies (presently Indonesia). Taiwan served as the organizational
zone and key inventory base for Japan's military in Southeast Asia during the
fight, as well as the control center for all transit over the Taiwan Strait.
Except for Singapore, the US State Department stated at the time that no
location in the Far East featured such a dominant role. The geology of Taiwan
tells the tale.
Taiwan is located 100 miles east of China, along the edge of
the South China Sea's transit routes. It is 200 miles to the south of the
Philippines, 700 miles to China's Hainan Island, and 900 miles to Vietnam and
the Spratly Islands. It is linked to the Ryukyu Islands to the north and lies
700 miles from Japan's main islands. Overall, Taiwan's critical location off
the Chinese coast and between Northeast and Southeast Asia has met a variety of
critical demands for local powers, both hostile and cautious. . Taiwan remains
geologically at the confluence of a substantial chunk of East Asia's danger
foci in the modern time. (In fact, duties dispatched from Taiwan may have an impact
on a conflict on the Korean Peninsula.)
Using firsthand knowledge, the question is whether Taiwan
would be as significant a crucial resource for a potential adversary in Asia
now as it was for Japan in the 1940s. The primary powers that are now
undermining the region's harmony and stability are the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea in Northeast Asia and its sponsor and protector, the People's
Republic of China, which has dynamic continuing issues in both Northeast and
Southeast Asia. Taiwan, which Beijing says is an important part of the Chinese
territory, would improve China's strategic position in both regions.
Controlling Taiwan would help China's actions in the South China Sea and let it
assert its regional and oceanic arguments against the Philippines, Vietnam,
Malaysia, and Brunei much more firmly.
China's universal "nine-run line" would appear out
of nowhere to be far more authentic and successfully enforced by Beijing. The
bulk of the 1600 long-range missiles now aimed at Taiwan and the US Navy might
be relocated to Taiwan and redirected against the ships and areas of other
Southeast Asian governments, as well as the transit routes used by global
industry. China would be in a better position to make the South China Sea the "Chinese
lake" that it claims as a verified right.
Furthermore, from China's perspective, Taiwan is one of the
primary links in the mythical "first island chain" that includes
Japan, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia.
Beijing sees the navigational "stifle points" between those islands
as requiring the People's Liberation Army's maritime access to the "second
island chain" (Guam, the Marianas, the Palau island group, and other small
islands in the central Pacific) and from there out of the shadows sea a long
way from China's shores. China's East China Sea coastline falls short of the
deepwater ports required to maintain its marine bases located there.
Its submarines should operate on a surface level until they can
drop and plunge deeply when they reach the Ryukus archipelagoes. If China ruled
Taiwan, its submarines would have a far easier time escaping into the Pacific
from Taiwan's deep seaports. They might pose a new concern for Japan, which
relies entirely on East Asia's water routes for oil and other natural
resources. Chinese submarines and an improved ability to project power into the
Pacific might also pose a greater threat to the United States Seventh Fleet,
Guam, Hawaii, and, surprise, the West Coast of the United States. Furthermore,
to the extent that China's far-reaching naval force diverts Washington and
Tokyo and encourages North Korea's as of yet irresponsible pioneer, it might
directly imperial South Korean security.
Control of the island of Taiwan, from a purely nautical and
military standpoint, would constitute a massive essential resource for China,
as well as a threat to the region in both Southeast and Northeast Asia, as well
as the United States. Chinese control of Taiwan, its mechanically best-in-class
economy, and control of the district's access into the South China Sea would
have significant monetary, conciliatory, and political repercussions. . Despite
a substantially more capably organized China, there would most likely be a
decreasing influence as territory states recalculate their concerns. Singapore
may be intimidated into a more pro-China stance, linking Beijing's control of
the South China Sea with Taiwan to the north and Singapore to the south.
Denying China that resource and influence are clearly in the vital security and
financial interests of Southeast Asian, Japanese, and American states.
However, for a brief period following World War II,
Washington appeared to overlook Taiwan's critical importance, even after China
had fallen to the Communists. Secretary of State Acheson's well-known National
Press Club speech in January 1950 depicted America's security advantage in Asia
but did not include Taiwan or South Korea. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung, as well
as their senior ally, Josef Stalin, saw the statement as proving that the
United States would not protect either country and considered it as a green
light for their expansionist aspirations. Pyongyang was the first to act,
attacking South Korea in June 1950.
The Truman administration, which had previously dismissed
Taiwan's security importance to the United States, was astonished by the
exposed hatred and determined that it must not be tolerated. It orchestrated a
rapid United Nations Security Council goal of endorsing the international use
of power to protect South Korea. Fearing further Communist advances in Asia,
the president changed direction again, dispatching the Seventh Fleet to deter a
Chinese attack on Taiwan. (It was also designed to thwart Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-effort to re-ignite the Chinese
Civil War.) Since their expulsion from China, the Nationalists had promised to
reclaim the central region.) Truman's statement clarified the emotional shift
in US policy toward Taiwan during Cold War:
"The attack on Korea proves unequivocally that
Communism will no longer use disruption to defeat free countries, but will
instead use aggression and war. It has defied the United Nations Security
Council's directives to preserve global peace and security.”
In these circumstances, Communist control of Formosa would
pose an urgent threat to the security of the Pacific area and the United States'
powers operating in their legal and important roles in the region.
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