BRI and China's Relations with its Neighbors: An European Perspective: Part 4

                                                                                             

Gyalaphug is not the most common location for cross-line settlement. The Menchuma Valley, known as Minjiuma in Chinese, is located south of a 16,200-foot-high pass known as the Bod La, or "Tibet Pass," which, as the name implies, has long been regarded as the border between Bhutan and Tibet. The line is now 4 miles south of the pass, according to Chinese guides. The new boundary is only 3.7 miles from Singye Dzong, another notable monument in Bhutan. China completed the main road across the Bod La and into the Menchuma Valley in mid-2017.

 According to Indian guard investigator Jayadeva Ranade, 20 families have already taken permanent residence by 2019. As of January, 50 units of accommodation were visible on satellite images of the town, and the third phase of development activity had begun. On Feb. 9, an article in the Tibet Daily praised the new occupiers, saying, "They are steadfast in executing customary boundary watches."

 

Another town is under development in the Beyul adjacent to the tactical station at Dermalung, 6.8 miles southeast of Gyalaphug, soon after the Jakarlung takes a sharp go toward the south. Like Menchuma, it will be a "next to the-line movement town" that will be combined with a close-by station for line monitors. By August 2020, as another street was being fabricated toward the east along the upper Jakarlung, an unidentified compound showed up on satellite symbolism 5.6 miles toward the east of Gyalaphug. The compound has seven quarters-style single-story structures with red rooftops organized around a square, which could house at least 100 individuals a trademark example of a Chinese sleeping enclosure.

 Even though Chinese media has provided no information on the tactical units in the Beyul, this facility is likely to house troops from China's Second Border Defense Regiment, which is responsible for guarding the lines in Lhokha (Shannan in Chinese), including Lhodrak. Only in April 2020 was a confirmed appearance in Chinese media of troops training for deployment in the Beyul-an officer with a rifle standing watchman next to the TAR party secretary, Wu Yingjie, at the tactical station on nearby La, the pass just south of Gyalaphug that prompts the Pagsamlung Valley, the western piece of the Beyul.

From satellite images or Chinese media photos, more modest military or police posts can be recognized. Two are on the Ngarab La (in tents rather than buildings); one each at Gyalaphug, Menchuma, and Dermalung; and two others are said to be in the Pagsamlung, as well as two larger mixes on the upper Jakarlung's north bank. A goliath design or some likeness thereto, maybe a signs tower, has been constructed high on an edge sitting over Gyalaphug from the north. A few 1.9 miles southwest of the Ngarab La, what appears to be a satellite receiving station has been constructed, the main occurrence of safety found in the Pagsamlung.

Chinese forces can only get to China's guaranteed line with Bhutan at the southern tip of the Beyul by foot at the moment. However, construction on an important road running southwest from Gyalaphug through the Ngarab La is nearly complete. A second road from the upper Jakarlung leads southwest into the mountains to what a few unofficial Chinese sources claim is a tactical station at the abandoned sanctuary of Lhalung Lhakhang, also on the Pagsamlung's bank, 9 miles south of the Bhutanese border.

These roadways will provide the Chinese with motorable access to the Pagsamlung, allowing them to move soldiers and development teams down to the far south of the Beyul; once that is completed, we can expect to see ultra-durable border posts along China's case line. Five years ago, none of these streets or military locations existed. There is nothing Bhutan can do because the 1998 agreement, in which the two parties agreed not to change the status in disputed areas, has been shattered by Beijing's actions on the ground.

It's tough to grasp China's justification for shifting from grazing on a neighbor's territory to gulping pieces of it off. If Bhutan refuses to play with its ties with India and rejects China's package deal, Beijing's move would have seriously tarnished a once cordial relationship for very little reward. Indian convictions that China intends to take its border regions will be strengthened; people all over the Himalayas, confronted with the capture of one of Bhutan's most sacred regions, will be skeptical of Chinese guarantees and expectations; and tensions will rise within the global community concerning China's ambitions in regards to another country's territory.

 Previously, China's response to regional disagreements has not been magnificently effective, particularly where strongly entrenched social and strict features are at stake, as the case of Tibet has demonstrated. If nothing changes, the continual expansions of the Beyul and Menchuma Valley appear destined to add another cost to China's efforts to expand power beyond its borders.