The fight for worldwide dominance between Iran's Shiite
religious regime and the nations led by Sunni Arabs and, more recently, Sunni
Turkey is eroding social compacts, degrading state fragility, and sparking
extremist trends. Both sides have weaponized rigid character for their ends,
reviving sectarianism and bolstering their influence across the region.
As a result, the more widespread Middle East remains a
tinderbox. Even while Iran has the upper hand, challenges to its status are
spreading throughout the region. Sunnis have grown tired of damaging extremism,
yet the hatred that fueled the rise of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS)
remains undiminished; fresh protests in the shattered parts of the district
will undoubtedly quell that rage. Sunnis in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria are
increasingly resisting initiatives by Tehran and its allies to consolidate
control. Furthermore, psychological persecution has resurfaced in Afghanistan
as the country descends into chaos following the Taliban's victory. With no
political cycle to alleviate these stresses, they will evict future influxes of
migrants and apocalypse and carnage.
Israel's intervention in these political disputes amongst
Sunni states has further fueled the flames. Because of Israel's involvement, provincial
stability is far more dependent on the outcome of Iran's nuclear program.
Washington and Jerusalem are currently considering a "Plan B" if a
final deal remains elusive. This would place Iran and the US on a collision
course while also fueling party tensions, fostering cultural differences, and
igniting new conflicts from the Levant to Afghanistan.
Washington's
desire to do less in the Middle East comes at a time when China and Russia are
inclining toward the region, Iran's hardline regime is digging in its heels,
and Sunni Arab governments are less assured than at any time in recent memory
about US security guarantees. Except that if the US prepares for a more
consistent local request-beginning with a deal over Iran's nuclear program-it
may find itself drawn back into the Middle East's multiple conflicts, despite
its best efforts to depart.
The 2003
US-led invasion of Iraq allowed Iran to considerably expand its influence in
the Arab world. Since the US demolished the tyrant system that ensured Sunni
minority rule in Baghdad, Tehran has expertly played on partisan loyalties to
engage an organization of equipped intermediaries that now extends from Lebanon
and Syria to Iraq and Yemen, framing what Jordan's King Abdullah once referred
to as a "Shiite bow." As a result, Iran has empowered Shiites to the
detriment of Sunnis throughout the region and increased its influence over foes
such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The claimed
Arab Spring, the Arab world's desire for a vote-based system and good
governance, pushed despots and endangered democracy, sectarianism may be
weaponized further as a result of the prospect of development. Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad instilled fear in Sunnis to galvanize the Syrian Alawite people
group, to which he belongs and which has its roots in Shiism, into unwavering
support for his regime. In Bahrain and Yemen, regimes justified harsh
crackdowns by accusing Shiite dissidents of acting as Iranian go-betweens.
Iran and
its Arab adversaries created this dynamic by aligning themselves with their
respective Shiite and Sunni clients, viewing their coreligionists as tools to
secure their local effect. Iran's geographical influence has grown in tandem
with its nuclear program. Even though the United States can look at Iran's
nuclear ambitions in 2015 through a globally approved agreement, limiting its
domestic ambitions has proven difficult. Washington's demand that local issues
not be acknowledged during nuclear talks enraged its Arab partners, who were
then fighting political proxy warfare in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. US President
Barack Obama fueled their anxieties about Washington's commitment to assist
them in these confrontations when he directed that the Iranians and Saudis
cooperate "to consider as an appealing manner of sharing the space."
The Sunni
Arab powers saw the nuclear agreement as a bookend to the Obama
administration's previous unwillingness to destabilize the Assad regime.
According to Bedouin pioneers, these two choices swung the provincial balance
of power decisively in favor of Tehran: the inability to depose Assad empowered
Tehran's Shiite friends in other countries and the atomic agreement fizzled to
limit Iran's provincial invading. To the Arab leaders, it seemed as though the US
was supporting Iranian dominance in the Middle East.
President
Donald Trump of the United States responded thoughtfully to that viewpoint. He
withdrew from the nuclear agreement in 2018 and stated that another agreement
would be required to resolve Iran's territorial role. His "biggest
strain" crusade imposed crippling sanctions on Iran and aimed to make it
financially impossible for Tehran to defend its position in the Arab world.
Under Trump, Washington discovered several measures to restrain Iran, including
executing a robot strike in 2020 that killed Qasem Soleimani, the commander of
Iran's Quds Force, and Abu Mahdi alMuhandis, a prominent Iraqi Shiite volunteer
army leader.
The Trump
campaign was successful in hammering Iran's economy, increasing social
pessimism, and fomenting political dissatisfaction. In any event, its attempt
to force a wider Iranian departure from the Arab world was a catastrophic
failure. Iran retaliated by increasing regional strains: it attacked large
transports in the Persian Gulf, designated oil offices in Saudi Arabia, and
launched a nerve-wracking missile strike on Iraqi airbases that held US
soldiers, putting Iran and the US closer to war than at any point in recent
memory.
Iran
emerged from the Trump era more powerful and lethal. Since the United States
exited the nuclear agreement, Iran has increased its stockpile of advanced
uranium, enlarged its atomic framework, and obtained basic atomic capability.
It is perilously close to having enough fissile material for an atomic weapon
right now. The decision to abandon the nuclear agreement, rather than the
decision to sign it in the first place, has made Iran a more powerful player in
the region. Tehran's atomic and provincial objectives have become inextricably
linked: a reliable atomic program provides a cover that protects its middlemen
all over the world, therefore expanding Iran's reach. As a result, the more
comprehensive and robust the atomic umbrella, the more appealing the middlemen
that it entails work under its insurance policy By reducing the scope of Iran's
nuclear program, the 2015 nuclear agreement also reduced the confidence Tehran
could provide to its intermediate powers. With the agreement in place and Iran
rapidly advancing its nuclear program, its territorial powers will become bolder.
During the
Trump administration, Iran's hardliners consolidated their control even more.
They regarded the "most extreme tension" crusade as vindication of
their position: it produced proof that the US was pursuing a power transfer in
Tehran and would not surrender until the Islamic Republic crumbled. This
rendered Washington's pledge meaningless and signaled that Iran might obtain
its desires through confrontation with the US and its allies. In this regard,
Iran has emerged from the shadows to go ahead with its nuclear program and
cement its position in the region.
Iran's new
president, Ebrahim Raisi, made it clear during his speech to the United Nations
General Assembly in September that he recognizes the province's overall
dominance is changing in favor of Tehran. Raisi said the images of Afghan
civilians falling from US jets departing Afghanistan, as well as the January 6
crowd outside the US Legislative Hall, conveyed a clear message to the world:
"The United States' dominating framework has no validity, within or
outside the nation."
As such
proclamations suggest, Iran's new administration has adopted a triumphalist
stance in the Middle East on several occasions. In its opinion, Iranian
intervention in Syria rescued Assad despite determined American, European,
Turkish, and Sunni Arab efforts to depose him. In Yemen, a ruthless US-backed
Saudi military effort failed to change the fact that the Houthis are immovably
ensconced in the capital of Sanaa and almost the whole country's north. Iran
has also defended its current condition in Iraq and Lebanon, despite monetary
problems and what it deems encroachment from its adversaries.
The
fundamental of maintaining Iran's impact in the Arab world is now included in
the fundamental math of the nation's subterranean administration, and the local
armies that Tehran has built for that task are realities on the ground
throughout the region. In any event, despite Iran's fresh victories in general,
the partisan confrontations that are raging across the Middle East are far from
over.
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